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1.  Introduction 
In the empirical literature on relationship banking the number of bank relationships is 
widely used as a proxy for the strength of bank-customer-relationships or borrowing 
concentration of a bank customer (see Petersen and Rajan, 1994; Houston and James, 1996; 
Harhoff and Körting, 1998a, 1998b; Machauer and Weber, 1998; Ongena and Smith, 1999; 
D’Auria, Foglia and Reedtz, 1999). Such a proxy can be understood as an indicator for the 
negotiation power of credit granting banks. Negotiation power m ay help banks to extract 
excess returns in loan business. However, the number of bank relationships variable does not 
take other banks into account which are currently not doing business with the borrower but 
which are additional potential competitors for the relationship banks. 
A possible impact of a high number of bank relationships is that firms can play banks off 
against each other. If they are willing to do so, the maximum possible degree of competition 
between banks takes place. Otherwise, if customers feel tied to their main bank or housebank, 
as it is called in this study, competition even if possible can not develop its abilities to the full. 
While the link between the number of bank relationships and competition seems to be 
plausible there are other facts that could be represented by the number of bank relationships. 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) interpret the number of bank relationships as a hint to the firms’ 
quality. If a firm is unable to get additional funds from one bank, it approaches other banks 
for credit. The unwillingness of the original bank to increase lending might indicate that the 
quality of the potential borrower is low.  
Finally, the size of firms should have influence on their number of bank relationships. 
Larger firms require a wide  range of bank transactions which may be allotted to a variety of 
specialized banks (see Ongena and Smith, 1999). This is especially true for companies with 
an emphasis on international business. 
In this paper, we put the above arguments in a broader theoretical context. Then, we use 
data from six leading German banks and apply a two step analysis. At first, we try to discover 
possible factors which influence the number of bank relationships chosen by firms. Secondly, 
we analyze the effect of the number of b ank relationships on bank competition 
operationalized by loan term requirements of banks. The data consists of randomly chosen 
credit files of two hundred and sixty small and medium-sized firms which had a credit 
relationship with one of the six banks within the years 1992 to 1996. 
A special feature of our analysis is that we could use bank internal credit ratings as a proxy 
for borrower quality. Additionally our data set contains a so called “housebank”-variable   
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defined to be “one” if the bank feels to be in a close relationship to its customer and “zero” 
if this is not the case. With these variables we are able to control for effects of borrower 
quality and for soft facts which influence the strength of the relationship but which are not 
honored by using the “number of banks”-variable. 
It is shown that company size and the existence of a housebank relationship correlate with 
the number of bank relationships. Borrower quality, even combined with the existence of a 
housebank, has no effect on the number of b ank relationships. Loan terms like 
collateralization and credit availability from one bank are influenced by the number of bank 
relationships whereas interest rates are not. Collateralization and credit availability from a 
certain bank is negatively correlated to the number of bank relationships. For borrowers with 
only a few bank relationships, the existence of a close relationship to a housebank leads to 
more collateralization. Credit availability is improved for all borrowers with a housebank 
relationship.  
2.  Recent literature 
The theoretical literature on competition in relationship banking circles around the 
discussion of how many bank relationships might be favorable for borrowers. Sharpe (1990) 
and Rajan (1992) point out that exclusive relationships to main banks or only a few banks 
create “information monopolies” or hold-up problems. During such close relationships the 
problem of asymmetric information gets less severe because banks can assess the firm’s 
quality and reliability better. However, they do not quote adequate terms of lending. They 
recognize that lenders who want to change banks face switching costs. Other banks must 
insist upon stricter loan terms because their assessment quality is weaker. Thus main banks 
are able to require stricter loan  terms with respect to borrower quality than what is just 
admissible without such monopoly effects. 
Petersen and Rajan (1995) propose a strong relationship to main banks over time as a 
possibility to overcome rationing problems. Their contribution to the literature complements 
the approaches of Bester (1985), Besanko and Thakor (1987) and Bester and Hellwig (1987) 
who used loan terms and collateralization as signaling and incentive mechanisms. In their 
model, Petersen and Rajan show that a close relationship to their borrowers enables banks to 
require moderate terms of lending (especially lower interest rates) relative to average 
borrower quality in the early stage of a relationship and stricter terms of lending (especially 
higher interest rates) in later stages when the average borrower quality has risen because 
borrowers of bad quality went into bankruptcy. Thus banks smooth the dynamics of terms of   
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lending over time according to changes in borrower quality. This mechanism leads to gains 
in efficiency b ecause the necessity of credit rationing given borrower quality can be reduced 
or avoided. 
Under the assumption that hidden information problems are severe Detragiache, Garella 
and Guiso (1997), in their model, propose that despite high transaction costs a multitude of 
bank relationships is optimal for borrowers who want to insure themselves against rationing 
which is to be expected in times of liquidity problems of their main bank. Similar to Petersen 
and Rajan (1994), they argue that a denial to roll over credit by the main bank will be an 
unfavorable signal to outside banks who can not assess borrower quality accurately because 
of a lacking relationship history. These outside banks will suppose bad borrower quality being 
the reason for the denial. 
The argument of favoring fewer bank relationships is supported by the fact that transaction 
costs, the costs of opening and coordinating bank accounts, play a role in the decision of how 
many bank relationships are suitable. We hypothesize a tendency of the number of bank 
relationships growing with firm size because large firms require a wide range of bank 
transactions which may be allotted to a variety of specialized banks. Additionally, large firms 
have their specialized financial department that does not bother handling business with a wide 
variety of banks. 
Using descriptive statistics Ongena and Smith (1999) find weak evidence for a relation 
between the number of bank relationships and firm size. They refer to data of large European 
firms. The results of Harhoff a nd Körting (1998b) confirm this view for large German firms 
which tend to have many institutional creditors. Both studies are not able to make accurate 
statements about the correlation of the number of bank relationships and borrower quality. 
While Ongena  and Smith in their regression analysis do not introduce any variable serving as 
a proxy for borrower quality, Harhoff and Körting only use a dummy variable for distressed 
firms. They show that such firms have more creditor relationships.  
Other studies only use the number of bank relationships as an exogenous variable in 
regressions of bank loan terms like interest rates, collateralization and availability of credit. 
Interpreting the number of bank relationships as a proxy for competition, the effect of 
competition on loan terms can be measured by these analyses. 
Petersen and Rajan (1994) find a significantly positive relationship between the level of 
interest rates and the number of bank relationships. This finding is contrary to our view that 
the number of bank relationships represents competition which should lead to lower interest 
rates. However, Petersen and Rajan interpret a small number of bank relationships as a signal  
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for high borrowing concentration that leads to lower interest rates because certain banks have 
larger loan sizes which they honor with a discount. An opposing view is that larger loan sizes 
are linked with an extension of bank exposure to borrower risk. Thus, the expected loss is 
higher and therefore interest rates should be higher. However, empirical studies in this field 
like Ewert and Schenk (1998) and Machauer and Weber (1998) do not support this view. 
3.  Data 
3.1.  General description 
Our data on bank-borrower-relationships was drawn from a set of credit files coming from 
six major German banks: Bayerische Vereinsbank, Deutsche Bank, Commerzbank, DG Bank, 
Dresdner Bank, and WestLB. These banks represent six of the nine biggest banks in Germany 
at the end of the year 1996. The data covers the period from January 1992 to December 1996. 
Since the analysis focuses on small and medium-sized firms the set of feasible relationships is 
generally limited to firms with an annual turnover between EUR 25 and 250 million. 
Furthermore the minimum loan size should not be under EUR 1.5 million.
1 No relationships 
with firms of the eastern part of Germany, the former German Democratic Republic, were 
involved because the nature of such relationships is dominated by industrial restructuring with 
a specific risk structure in credit portfolios that is expected to differ substantially from that of 
customers in the western part of Germany. For a detailed description of the data set see Elsas, 
Henke, Machauer, Rott and Schenk (1998). See Elsas and Krahnen (1998, 1999), Ewert and 
Schenk (1998) and Machauer and Weber (1998) for first results gained from the analyses of 
this data set. 
The data set consists of sample A and sample P. For sample A 125 customer relationships 
were taken randomly from the population of “all” the borrowers described above. Usually, the 
whole credit history of these relationships is available for the period of 1992 to 1996. 
However, some credit relationships with borrowers of very good quality were not evaluated 
every year. Sample P consists of 135 customer relationships. It was drawn from a subset of 
the population of all borrowers described above with the special characteristic that they are 
“problematic” or "potentially distressed". The characteristic “problematic” or “potentially 
distressed” was defined as a borrower being of category 5 or 6 on a calibrated credit rating 
scale of 1 to 6 (described below) once between 1992 and 1996. Sample P was drawn to 
                                                 
1  The exchange rate of the Euro in US-Dollars at the end of 1996 was: .7940 US$/EUR.  
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strengthen the number of customers with poor credit ratings which otherwise would be too 
small to generate statistically significant results. 
For s everal credit relationships the data does not cover the full range of the period from 
1992 to 1996. The reason for this is that data for some variables was just not available or that 
some relationships started in the years after 1992. 
The rating scale from 1 to 6 was created by Elsas, Henke, Machauer, Rott and Schenk 
(1998) to make the internal ratings of the six banks in this study comparable. In order to 
achieve this calibration the rating subcategories on certain borrower characteristics were 
matched to  get the new six rating classes with 1 being very good, 2 being good or above 
average, 3 being average, 4 being below average, 5 being problematic and 6 being very much 
in danger of default. 
3.2.  Definition of the variables 
The variables used for the following a nalysis are shown in Table 1. We begin by 
explaining variables of the debt  contract. The loan rate spread (SPREAD) is defined as the 
difference between the loan interest rate for withdrawals on current accounts and the capital 
market i nterest rate for the  same duration of lending. We used the 3 -month Frankfurt 
Interbank Offered Rate (FIBOR3M) as our reference. Bankers consider this rate as the 
appropriate  market rate to refinance this kind of lending because borrowers usually do not 
repay their loans on a day-to-day basis, even if they can.  
To define the collateralized percentage of the lines of credit (COLLAT), we used the 
internal evaluation of the liquidation value of collateralized assets on which banks base their 
decision making. Total lines of credit  (TLC) include all forms of credit a bank grants to its 
customers, i.e. lines of credit for cash loans, discounted bills, guarantees and margins of 
derivatives. Banks refer to these overall lines in decision making on an increase or decrease of 
their loan business with the customer. 
The number of bank  relationships with a loan engagement of the bank is represented by 
NUMBANK which is an integer variable ranging from one to forty in our data set. It is used 
as dependent variable in the regression of the next  chapter. In the regressions which identify 
the effect of the number of bank relationships or, finally, the effect of competition on loan 
terms a set of dummy variables is used to enable us distinguishing the effects of different 
numbers of bank relationships. NUMB1_3 has a value of one if the number of bank 
relationships a borrower has is one to three, else it has a value of zero. NUMB4_7 is defined 
similarly. NUMB8_ equals one if the number of bank relationships is eight or greater than 
eight, else it equals zero.  
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To consider effects of the closeness of relationship banking we control for the fact that a so 
called housebank relationship between the borrower and the bank exists. The HOUSEBANK-
variable is equal to one if there is evidence for such a relationship in the credit files of the 
banks. Sometimes there was a direct indication like: "We are the housebank", sometimes the 
activities of the bank commented in the credit file gave hints to housebank relationships. We 
thus use a direct variable of a housebank indication while other studies like Blackwell and 
Winters (1997), Berger and Udell (1995), Petersen and Rajan (1994, 1995) and Boot and 
Thakor (1994) used indirect variables like the age of the firm and the duration of the bank-
customer relationship (DURATION). The latter variable is also used in our study. The 
variable NON-HOUSEBANK is complementary to the HOUSEBANK variable. 
Variables on  risk characterize default risk of borrowers without taking collateral into 
account. Dummy variable R12 equals one if  a borrower is of rating category 1 or 2 and zero 
otherwise. R3 is one if a borrower is of rating category 3 and so on. We combined rating 
categories 1 and 2 into one variable because only a few borrowers in our sample were of 
rating category 1.  
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Table 1.  Variable description 
Variable  Description 
Contract   
SPREAD  spread between loan rate and FIBOR3M 
COLLAT  collateralized percentage of borrower total credit line 
TLC  Borrower total credit line (thousands of Euros) 
Market   
FIBOR3M  3-month Frankfurt Interbank Offered Rate (%) 
Relationship   
NUMBANK  Number of bank relationships 
NUMB1_3  = 1 if the number of bank relationships is 1, 2 or 3; = 0 else 
NUMB4_7  = 1 if the number of bank relationships is 4, 5, 6 or 7 
NUMB8_  = 1 if the number of bank relationships is 8 or greater than 8 
NON-HOUSEBANK (NB)  = 1 if bank does not feel as housebank of the borrower 
HOUSEBANK (HB)  = 1 if bank feels as housebank of the borrower 
DURATION  Duration of the bank-customer relationship in years 
Risk   
R12  = 1 if borrower is of rating category 1 or 2 
R3, R4, R5, R6  = 1 if borrower is of rating category 3, 4, 5 or 6 respectively 
Governance   
CORP  = 1 if borrower is a corporation (AG, KGaA, GmbH) 
PARTNER  = 1 if borrower is a partnership 
PROP  = 1 if borrower is a sole proprietorship 
Size   
TA  total assets 
TO  turnover 
Banks   
B1, B2, B3, B4, B5, B6  = 1 if bank 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 or 6 is the lender 
 
Variables on  governance characterize the legal form of the firms.  The dummy variable 
CORP indicates whether the firm is a corporation, i.e. Aktiengesellschaft, Kommandit-
gesellschaft auf Aktien or a Gesellschaft mit beschränkter Haftung in Germany.  PARTNER 
indicates whether the firm is a partnership like Offene Handelsgesellschaft or 
Kommanditgesellschaft and PROP indicates whether there is a sole proprietor of the firm who 
usually manages its business like an Einzelunternehmung in Germany. In partnerships and in 
proprietorships the owners are liable for the firm’s debt with their whole private property 
whereas in corporations the liability of the owners is limited to their contribution to capital. 
Total assets (TA) of the borrowers represent company size. As seen in many studies, size 
has an effect on loan terms. It should also be a factor for the decision on the number of bank 
relationships as previously explained. In the regression of total credit lines relative to total 
assets we use the turnover (TO) of the firm to avoid interdependencies between the dependent 
and the independent variables.  
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The dummy variables on  banks help to control for bank specific effects. B1 to B6 are equal 
to one if the credit file which was analyzed comes from the related bank. We use B1 to B6 
instead of the banks’ names in order to maintain confidentiality. 
4.  Number of bank relationships 
4.1.  Descriptive statistics 
In order to give an impression of the distribution of the number of bank relationships 
borrowers maintain table 2 shows some descriptive statistics for the years of 1992 to 1996, 
respectively. It seems that borrowers’ bank relationships remain stable over  time because the 
statistics do not indicate significant changes. The number of valid observations for the 
different years is smaller than the number of borrowers in the data set which is 260. The fact 
that we could not get reliable data for every data field and every year is responsible for this. 
As the frequencies for the certain numbers of bank relationships illustrate, about one third 
of the companies generally have three or less than three relationships. Another third has four 
to seven bank relationships and the rest has eight or more than eight relationships. The median 
for the number of bank relationships throughout all years from 1992 to 1996 is five. For the 
years between 1993 to 1996 the average number of bank relationships is below six. In 1992 it 
is slightly above six.   
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Table 2.  Descriptive statistics on the number of bank relationships 
statistic  1992  1993  1994  1995  1996 
valid observations  169  174  197  187  190 
mean  6.21  5.84  5.68  5.66  5.70 
standard deviation  4.01  4.53  4.26  4.48  4.60 
median  5  5  5  5  5 
minimum  1  1  1  1  1 
1
st tercile  4  4  3  3  3 
2
nd tercile  7  6  7  6  7 
maximum  25  40  40  40  40 
frequencies [%]           
NUMBANK = 1  4.14  5.75  5.08  6.42  6.29 
NUMBANK = 2  10.65  12.64  12.69  12.30  12.05 
NUMBANK = 3  13.61  13.79  16.75  17.11  15.21 
NUMBANK = 4  12.43  12.64  11.17  10.16  16.32 
NUMBANK = 5  9.47  13.22  12.18  11.76  11.11 
NUMBANK = 6  10.65  12.07  9.14  10.70  10.53 
NUMBANK = 7  10.65  5.17  10.66  12.30  10.08 
NUMBANK = 8  4.73  6.90  8.12  5.88  4.21 
NUMBANK = 9  8.28  5.75  2.54  1.07  3.16 
NUMBANK ‡ 10  15.39  12.07  11.67  12.30  11.04 
 
The numbers here are comparable with the findings of Ongena and Smith (1999) who 
analyze bank relationships of companies of different countries in Europe. Their German 
subsample of medium-sized and large firms also show a median of five  bank relationships 
while the mean is 8.1. 39.7 percent of their German companies have between three to seven 
bank relationships while in our data set the proportion is about 33 percent. For their sample of 
small companies Harhoff and Körting (1998b) found  the average number of bank 
relationships being around two. 
Considering the terciles calculated for the certain years we can divide the data set in three 
equally sized groups with the number of bank relationships ranging from one to three 
(NUMB1_3), four to seven (NUMB4_7) and eight or more than eight (NUMB8_). We use 
this kind of partitioning in the following chapters for the analysis of loan terms. 
4.2.  Regressions analysis 
In a regression analysis with the number of bank relationships as the dependent variable we 
try to identify possible determinants of this variable. The number of bank relationships in the 
data set is an integer variable ranging from a minimum value of one to a maximum value of 
40. The distribution of this variable can be approximated by a Poisson pattern. Therefore, we 
use a random effects Poisson regression model (see Hausman, Hall and Griliches, 1984 for 
details). The random effects panel model eliminates borrower- and time-specific effects with  
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the inclusion of separate random error terms f or borrower specialties and time specialties (see 
Baltagi, 1996).  
The estimated coefficients of the independent variables are listed in table 3. The first two 
columns refer to a regression (1) with the HOUSEBANK-variable and the rating variables 
R12 to R  6 being separated. The second regression (2) uses interaction variables for the 
combined belonging to a certain rating category and to the housebank or non-housebank 
group. All other variables are used similarly to regression (1). 
It can be seen that like in Ongena and Smith (1999) and Harhoff and Körting (1998b) firm 
size represented by the logarithm of total assets of the firms (lnTA) has a statistically 
significant effect on the number of bank relationships. Larger firms use a greater number of 
banks for their financial business supporting the hypotheses that such firms need a variety of 
specialized banks for their business and that they dispose of more personnel to handle bank 
transaction. 
The DURATION of the bank relationship which is a proxy for the duration of bank 
relationships of the customer in general is also statistically but not economically significant. 
In another regression we also used the logarithm of the DURATION-variable and found 
similar results. With this in mind, we do not try to interpret the effect of the DURATION-
variable any further. 
In comparison, the coefficient of the HOUSEBANK-variable indicates significant 
influence on the number of bank relationships. It shows that customers with whom the banks 
feel to have a closer relationship dispose of a smaller number of alternative bank relationships 
(.236 less on average). Thus, competition should play a minor role in their relations. We 
address this hypothesis in the next chapter directly. 
Borrower quality, which is denoted by the dummy v ariables R12, R3, R4, R5 and R6 here, 
does not have substantial influence on the choice of the number of bank relationships. 
Regression (2) with interaction variables RH12 to RH6 and RN12 to RN6 combines the 
belonging to a certain category of borrower quality (R12 to R6) with the existence of a 
housebank relationship or a non-housebank relationship (HOUSEBANK, NON-
HOUSEBANK). In table 4 the differences between firms with and without housebank 
relationships within the rating categories are presented. The results are gained by variations of 
regression (2) with the non-housebank groups being the reference variables. These results 
support the housebank effect found above throughout all rating categories.   
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Table 3.  Regression of the number of bank relationships N UMBANK (coefficients of the independent 
variables, standard errors in parentheses) 
Independent variables  (1)    (2)   
lnTA  .165***  (.020)  .161***  (.020) 
DURATION  .006***  (.001)  .006***  (.001) 
NON-HOUSEBANK  reference       
HOUSEBANK  -.236***  (.037)     
R12  reference       
R3  -.005  (.035)     
R4  .018  (.039)     
R5  -.035  (.042)     
R6  -.011  (.060)     
RN12      reference   
RN3      -.088**  (.040) 
RN4      -.098**  (.043) 
RN5      -.167***  (.049) 
RN6      -.144**  (.073) 
RH12      -.342***  (.059) 
RH3      -.319***  (.056) 
RH4      -.305***  (.053) 
RH5      -.286***  (.060) 
RH6      -.263***  (.095) 
CORP  reference    reference   
PARTNER  .182***  (.070)  .188***  (.070) 
PROP  -.412***  (.118)  -.411***  (.119) 
B1  reference    reference   
B2  -.111  (.080)  -.127  (.080) 
B3  .057  (.092)  .081  (.092) 
B4  -.357***  (.095)  -.343***  (.095) 
B5  -.121  (.090)  -.092  (.090) 
B6  -.307***  (.124)  -.334***  (.124) 
constant  -.002  (.243)  .123  (.243) 
  c
2 (14) = 217.42***  c
2 (18) = 223.12*** 
  no. obs. = 723    no. obs. = 723   
***  Statistically significant at or better than the 1% level, two-tailed 
**  Statistically significant at or better than the 5% level, two-tailed 
*  Statistically significant at or better than the 10% level, two-tailed 
 
In the variations of regression (2) the coefficients of the interaction variables RH12 to R H6 
and RN12 to RN6 also suggest that there are no economically significant deviations between 
different rating categories within the housebank and non-housebank groups. Thus, we come to 
the conclusion that the number of bank relationships chosen by the firms are not driven by 
their credit rating. Rather, the closeness of the relationship which is analyzed here shows 
distinct correlation to the number of bank relationships in total. The problem to say which  
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variable, the number of bank relationships or the h ousebank property, is the driving factor, is 
comparable with the question who was there first, the duck or the egg. 
Table 4.  Differences between the housebank and non-housebank subgroups of the various rating categories 
gained by variations of the regression of the number of bank relationships with changing referential 
variables (coefficients of the housebank interaction variables, standard errors in parentheses) 
Rating category  non-housebank  housebank   
R12  reference  -.342***  (.059) 
R3  reference  -.276***  (.052) 
R4  reference  -.264***  (.048) 
R5  reference  -.196***  (.054) 
R6  reference  -.263***  (.097) 
 
In the regressions (1) and (2) we also analyzed if the juridical form of the firm is 
responsible for the number of bank relationships. The reason therefore c ould be that banks 
may prefer firms with unlimited liability like partnerships (PARTNER) or sole 
proprietorships (PROP). For partnerships this hypothesis seems well founded. However, for 
sole proprietorships the opposite is true. Thus, it is difficult in t his respect to come to a final 
conclusion. 
The coefficients of the dummy variables indicating a relationship to one of the banks 
which delivered data for our analysis (B1 to B6) point to significant differences in the number 
of bank relationships throughout the customers of different banks. However, this effect is not 
systematic with respect to bank size. 
5.  Competition represented by loan terms 
In the previous chapter we have seen that the number of bank relationships depends on the 
size of the firm and the e xistence of a housebank relationship. Firm quality has no effect. We 
now turn to the question, whether the number of bank relationships has any impact on bank 
competition about customers. Therefore, bank loan terms like loan rate spreads and 
collateralization and credit availability from the bank that delivered data are analyzed with 
respect to the influence of the number of bank relationships. 
5.1.  Loan rate spreads 
As the number of bank relationships of a customer increases it should be expected that the 
negotiation power of banks declines and so do loan rate spreads banks earn. We use a normal 
random effects panel regression model to separate this effect from other effects caused by 
borrower quality and the development of the general interest rate level over time. The panel   
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structure of the data requires the application of a random effects panel model which 
eliminates borrower- and time-specific effects with the inclusion of separate random error 
terms for borrower specialties and time specialties.  
Table 5 shows the estimation results for the coefficients of independent variables. The 
number of bank relationships variable was introduced by a dummy variable set distinguishing 
three groups, one group disposing of one to three banks for their financial business 
(NUMB1_3), another group having four to seven bank relationships (NUMB4_7) and a third 
group with eight or more than eight bank relationships (NUMB8_). Besides the classification 
into these groups other classifications were tried. However, more detailed classifications lead 
to high standard error terms in the estimation procedure which counteract getting significant 
results. Therefore, we used this kind of classification leading to equally weighted populations 
corresponding to the terciles gained in the descriptive analysis above. In a variation of this 
regression, denoted by (2) in the table 5, these groups are divided in two sub-groups, 
respectively, which are generated by the property of borrowers being in a housebank 
relationship or not. 
Before we come to the results concerning the number of bank relationships the effects 
caused by other variables should be discussed. The coefficient of the FIBOR3M-variable 
which represents the level of short-term interbank lending indicates that loan rate spreads are 
relatively small in times of high general interest rate levels and vice versa. This is a well 
known phenomenon in banking business. The works of Berger and Udell (1992) and 
Machauer and Weber (1998) provide empirical evidence for this kind of interest rate 
smoothing concerning bank loans. 
Borrower quality represented by bank internal credit ratings has significant influence on 
loan rate spreads. The estimation results presented in table 5 show that loan rate spreads 
increase successively with worsening borrower quality. The worst rating categories R5 and 
R6 pay around .6 % higher loan rates than the best ones, namely R12. The results go in line 
with the empirical literature on bond markets (see Fons, 1987 and Altman, 1989) and on bank 
lending (see Blackwell and Winters, 1997 and Machauer and Weber, 1998) 
Missing borrower quality can partially be compensated by offering collateral eventually 
leading to better loan rates. In the regression of loan rate spreads here a variable for 
collateralization is omitted because it shows multicolinearities with the variable of the number 
of bank relationships and thus disturbs the quality of estimation results. Nevertheless, 
collateralization has a positive influence on loan rate spreads. The more collateralization the 
cheaper i s the loan. We will provide a separate regression with collateralization as the  
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dependent variable and the number of bank relationships as an independent variable in the 
following sub-chapter.  
Table 5.  Regression of loan rate spreads SPREAD (coefficients of the independent variables, standard errors in 
parentheses) 
Independent variables  (1)    (2)   
FIBOR3M  -.321***  (.016)  -.322***  (.016) 
lnTA  -.247***  (.057)  -.245***  (.058) 
R12  reference    reference   
R3  .196*  (.113)  .190*  (.113) 
R4  .388***  (.125)  .369***  (.126) 
R5  .600***  (.137)  .582***  (.137) 
R6  .672***  (.211)  .645***  (.212) 
NUMB1_3  -.048  (.111)     
NUMB4_7  reference       
NUMB8_  .116  (.123)     
NON-HOUSEBANK  reference       
HOUSEBANK  .013  (.103)     
NUMB1_3NB      reference   
NUMB1_3HB      .126  (.156) 
NUMB4_7NB      .169  (.152) 
NUMB4_7HB      .044  (.173) 
NUMB8_NB      .207  (.188) 
NUMB8_HB      .305  (.231) 
B1  reference    reference   
B2  .525***  (.170)  .522***  (.171) 
B3  -.190  (.203)  -.206  (.205) 
B4  .144  (.197)  .111  (.201) 
B5  .005  (.201)  -.023  (.204) 
B6  .367*  (.217)  .345  (.220) 
constant  7.775***  (.692)  7.667***  (.673) 
  Adj. R
2 = .5334    Adj. R
2 = .5381   
  c
2 (14) = 584.36    c
2 (16) = 586,85   
  no. obs. = 561    no. obs. = 561   
***  Statistically significant at or better than the 1% level, two-tailed 
**  Statistically significant at or better than the 5% level, two-tailed 
*  Statistically significant at or better than the 10% level, two-tailed 
 
The size of the borrower represented by the logarithm of total assets (lnTA) leads to lower 
interest rate spreads. This result corresponds with findings in the literature on relationship 
banking (see Petersen and Rajan, 1994 and 1995, Blackwell and Winters, 1997 and Harhoff 
and Körting, 1998a). Only Berger and Udell (1995) could not identify this effect.  
The influence of the number of bank relationships on interest rate spreads of loans was first 
examined by Petersen and Rajan (1994). They found a significantly positive effect which  
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means that the interest rate spread on loans is high when the number of bank relationships is 
high. Thus, they give support for the hypothesis of Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) that 
relationships to only one or a few banks generate information monopolies which lead to 
higher loan terms. Other banks, the borrowers could switch to, face more severe asymmetric 
information problems because they do not know the borrower’s history. As a consequence, to 
compensate this kind of uncertainty they must require higher loan rate spreads than banks 
who know the history. Using the number of banks as an independent variable  like Petersen 
and Rajan (1994) Machauer and Weber (1998) found no significant effect of the number of 
bank relationships on interest rate premiums. 
The variable used by Petersen and Rajan (1994) and by Machauer and Weber (1998) 
corresponds to the dependent variable NUMBANK of the first regression in this paper. In 
Regression (1) an in-depth approach is tried by using a dummy variable technique to possibly 
identify structural effects between certain groups of borrowers with differing numbers of bank 
relationships. However, no significant differences between the groups NUMB1_3, 
NUMB4_7, NUMB8_ was found. The estimation result concerning the housebank variable 
which represents the closeness of the bank-customer-relationship support this finding. It 
shows no significant effect on interest rate spreads. 
In regression (2) the three groups NUMB1_3, NUMB4_7 and NUMB8_ are divided into 
two subgroups respectively. Thereby the suffix HB denotes the fact that borrowers belong to 
the subgroup with a housebank relationship and the suffix NB denotes the fact that they 
belong to the subgroup with no housebank relationship. Introducing these interaction 
variables we tried to identify any effect that would be covered by using the variables on the 
number of bank relationships and on the existence of a housebank relationship separately as in 
regression (1). In table 6 the differences are illustrated by coefficients gained from variations 
of regression analysis (2) with changing referential variables. It can be seen that there is n o 
significant difference between the interest rate spreads of the housebank and nonhousebank 
subgroups of NUMB1_3, NUMB4_7 and NUMB8_.  
Referring to the assumption that bank competition should have an effect on interest rate 
spreads when it is assured that the analysis controls for other influential variables like general 
interest rate levels, borrower size and borrower quality we conclude that the number of bank 
relationships does not represent bank competition, here. However, the question that remains 
is, if the number of bank relationships has any impact on loan collateralization which is 
another pricing component. In the next sub-chapter, we discuss influential factors on  
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collateralization, especially the number of bank relationships, in a separate r egression 
analysis. 
Table 6.  Differences between the housebank and non-housebank subgroups of borrower groups with different 
numbers of bank relationships. Results gained by three variations with changing referential variables 
of the regression of loan rate spreads SPREAD (coefficients of the housebank subgroup variables, 
standard errors in parentheses) 
variable  non-housebank 
(NB) 
housebank 
(HB) 
 
NUMB1_3  reference  .122  (.156) 
NUMB4_7  reference  -.112  (.142) 
NUMB8_  reference  .119  (.214) 
 
5.2.  Collateralization 
Collateral requirements help to reduce bank exposure to borrower risk. Aside from loan 
rates collateralization is a pricing factor which is influenced by bank competition. In the 
following regression analysis we use the percentage of the total credit line which is 
collateralized as the dependent variable. This variable is censored in so far as it ranges from 0 
to 100 in its values. The maximum is 100 percent even if the borrower provides collateral that 
has more value than the total credit line granted by the bank. The range of values below 0 is 
not d efined. To consider censoring in isolating the effect of competition represented by the 
number of bank relationships of firms we use a random effects Tobit panel regression model 
(see Tobin, 1958). 
In table 7 the e stimated coefficients of independent variables including the number of bank 
relationships are presented. It can be seen that the number of bank relationships has a 
significant impact on collateralization. Borrowers of the group with one to three bank 
relationships (NUMB1_3) collateralize 8.698 % more of their total credit line with the bank 
than borrowers of the reference group with four to seven bank relationships (NUMB4_7). 
This difference is significant at the five percent level. Borrowers of the group w ith eight or 
more bank relationships (NUMB8_) have to collateralize 6.532 % less of their total credit line 
than the ones of the reference group. However, this indication is not significant even at the ten 
percent level.  
At first sight, one could argue intuitively that when the number of bank relationships is 
high the amount of collateral granted to one of these banks is tendentiously low and therefore 
is not necessarily an indication of competition. However, in our study a relative number, 
namely the collateralized percentage of the borrowers’ total credit line, is regressed on the  
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independent variables like the number of bank relationships and borrower size. Such a 
variable which is related to the actual size of loan business with a bank is suitable to make 
statements about the indications of competition because a credit granting bank would like to 
make its value as large as possible given the other variables of loan business. Thus, the 
coefficients referring to the groups of borrowers with different numbers of bank relationships 
show that a larger number of bank relationships leads to a lower intensity of collateralization 
signaling that, in this case, competition between banks is strong and negotiation power is 
weak. 
Table 7.  Regression of collateralized percentage of the borrower total credit line COLLAT (coefficients of the 
independent variables, standard errors in parentheses) 
Independent variables  (1)    (2)   
lnTA  -2.997  (2.612)  -2.120  (2.383) 
R12  reference    reference   
R3  3.147  (5.046)  3.822  (5.116) 
R4  4.982  (5.367)  6.204  (5.463) 
R5  12.810**  (5.742)  13.045**  (5.703) 
R6  14.792*  (8.532)  15.124*  (8.502) 
NUMB1_3  8.698**  (4.499)     
NUMB4_7  reference       
NUMB8_  -6.532  (5.034)     
NUMB1_3NB      reference   
NUMB1_3HB      13.769**  (5.870) 
NUMB4_7NB      -5.388  (5.830) 
NUMB4_7HB      5.110  (7.316) 
NUMB8_NB      -13.549**  (7.048) 
NUMB8_HB      -.529  (8.479) 
B1  reference    reference   
B2  -17.299*  (9.620)  -19.618**  (9.328) 
B3  -20.211**  (10.208)  -18.250*  (9.868) 
B4  4.108  (9.533)  4.103  (9.505) 
B5  4.305  (8.320)  4.770  (8.577) 
B6  -6.709  (11.270)  -9.846  (11.005) 
constant  63.413**  (30.513)  55.009**  (27.750) 
  Wald 
c
2 (12) = 35.26 
  Wald 
c
2 (15) = 49.16 
 
  no. obs. = 757    no. obs. = 757   
***  Statistically significant at or better than the 1% level, two-tailed 
**  Statistically significant at or better than the 5% level, two-tailed 
*  Statistically significant at or better than the 10% level, two-tailed 
 
In a variation of the above regression, denoted by (2) in table 7, interaction variables are 
included which divide the borrower groups with one to three, four to seven and eight or more  
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than eight bank relationships into two subgroups with and without a housebank relationship, 
respectively. The results suggest slight evidence that the two subgroups with and without a 
housebank relationship of the group with one to three bank relationships (NUMB1_3NB, 
NUMB1_3HB) differ from each other by the fact that borrowers with a housebank 
relationship grant more collateral in relation to their total credit line. Variations of this 
regression w ith changing referential variables, namely NUMB4_7NB and NUMB8_NB, 
presented in table 8, do not indicate significant differences between the corresponding 
subgroups of borrowers with four to seven (NUMB4_7NB, NUMB4_7HB) and eight or more 
than eight relationships (NUMB8_NB, NUMB4_8HB). 
The results on the relation of collateralization and the number of bank relationships 
combined with the indications of the housebank variable provide support for the hypothesis of 
Sharpe (1990) and Rajan (1992) that banks with close relationships to their customers are in 
an information monopoly which they can use to improve their position in loan term 
negotiation. 
Table 8.  Differences between the housebank and non-housebank subgroup coefficients for borrower groups 
with different numbers of bank relationships. Results gained by three variations with changing 
referential variables of the regression of the collateralized percentage of the borrower total credit line 
COLLAT (coefficients of the housebank subgroup variables, standard errors in parentheses) 
variable  non-housebank 
(NB) 
housebank 
(HB) 
 
NUMB1_3  reference  13.769**  (5.870) 
NUMB4_7  reference  9.651  (6.693) 
NUMB8_  reference  9.936  (8.031) 
 
Other independent variables were included into the regression to control for borrower 
properties like size and quality and for lender specialties. We controlled for borrower size by 
the logarithm of total assets (lnTA). The coefficient does not indicate an effect on the 
collateralized percentage of the total credit line  
Borrower quality  has an expected influence on collateralization. The relation of the 
collateralized percentage of the borrowers’ total credit line to their internal bank rating shows 
that borrowers with sound or acceptable ratings (R12, R3, R4) collateralize their total lines of 
credit at a significantly lower level than borrowers of the worst rating categories (R5, R6). 
The reason why the worst borrowers are granting more collateral than the ones of better 
quality is obvious. By requiring more collateral banks try to reduce their exposure to 
borrower–risk while borrowers in a bad situation indicated by their quality do not have the   
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negotiation power to deny it. 
As the belonging of a customer to a certain bank is concerned, no systematic effect on 
collateralization can be identified with respect to certain bank characteristics.  
5.3.  Credit availability 
Besides loan rates and collateralization, credit availability for borrowers might be 
influenced by bank competition approximated by the number of banks a borrower deals with. 
In  a regression with the percentage of the borrowers’ total credit line at a certain bank relative 
to their total assets as the dependent variable we tried to identify its effect. The methodology 
chosen is similar to the one in the previous sub-chapter. The dependent variable is censored as 
its values may reach the 100 percent level and are not defined below 0. 
In table 9 the estimation results are presented. The ones for regression (1) suggest that 
members of the borrower group with one to three bank relationships (NUMB1_3) have a 
significantly higher proportion of financing by one specific bank than members of the 
borrower group with four to seven bank relationships (NUMB4_7). The coefficient has a 
value of 10.865 percent with a significance level below .001. Having in mind that the mean 
percentage of the total credit line with respect to the value of total assets for borrowers with 
four to seven bank relationships is 19.35 percent, 10.865 more in percentage points are about 
50 percent more relative to these 1 9.35 percentage points. Thus, this difference between the 
borrower group with one to three bank relationships and the borrower group with four to 
seven bank relationships is also significant in the economic point of view. Members of the 
borrower group with eight or more than eight bank relationships (NUMB8_) do not differ 
significantly from the ones with four to seven bank relationships with respect to their 
proportion of total assets financed by loans of one specific bank.  
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Table 9.  Regression of the borrowers’ total credit line TLC relative to the borrowers’ total assets (TA) 
(coefficients of the independent variables, standard errors in parentheses) 
Independent variables  (1)    (2)   
R12  reference    reference   
R3  11.255***  (3.464)  12.368***  (3.431) 
R4  13.265***  (3.670)  14.676***  (3.625) 
R5  17.029***  (3.936)  18.039***  (3.891) 
R6  31.090***  (5.535)  32.315***  (5.472) 
NUMB1_3  10.865***  (3.023)     
NUMB4_7  reference       
NUMB8_  -.504  (3.290)     
NUMB1_3NB      reference   
NUMB1_3HB      14.768***  (4.128) 
NUMB4_7NB      2.785  (4.656) 
NUMB4_7HB      -3.942  (3.788) 
NUMB8_NB      8.289  (5.550) 
NUMB8_HB      -6.774  (4.460) 
B1  reference    reference   
B2  -41.873***  (5.026)  -41.410***  (4.808) 
B3  -41.503***  (5.855)  -40.181***  (5.638) 
B4  -39.601***  (5.665)  -38.382***  (5.467) 
B5  -54.926***  (5.537)  -54.056***  (5.267) 
B6  -46.062***  (6.726)  -47.646***  (6.459) 
constant  57.473***  (4.507)  57.527***  (5.295) 
  Wald 
c
2 (11) = 143.69 
  Wald 
c
2 (14) = 175.62 
 
  no. obs. = 878    no. obs. = 878   
***  Statistically significant at or better than the 1% level, two-tailed 
**  Statistically significant at or better than the 5% level, two-tailed 
*  Statistically significant at or better than the 10% level, two-tailed 
 
In a variation of regression (1), denoted by (2) in table 9, interaction variables are included 
which divide the borrower groups with one to three, four to seven and eight or more than 
eight bank relationships into two subgroups with and without a housebank relationship, 
respectively. In table 10, it can be seen that with respect to their total credit line relative to 
total assets members of the borrower groups with one to three and eight or more than eight 
bank relationships that have a housebank relationship (NUMB1_3HB, NUMB8_HB) differ 
significantly from their counterparts without a housebank relationship (NUMB1_3NB, 
NUMB8_NB). The coefficients representing the differences between the corresponding 
subgroups with values of 14.768 percentage points and 10.951 percentage points are 
remarkably high. Referred to the mean percentages of the total  credit line related to total 
assets of the non-housebank borrower groups with values of 19.30 and 14.98 percentage 
points, respectively, the relative differences of housebank borrowers to non-housebank  
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borrowers are 76.5 percent and 73.10 percent. Thus, despite the fact that housebank borrowers 
within the group NUMB4_7 do not differ significantly from non-housebank borrowers with 
respect to the f inancing proportion of the bank, the results give a distinct hint to the 
hypothesis that housebanks take a greater stake in financing their customers than other banks 
in a non-housebank relationship. These findings support the proposition of Petersen and Rajan 
(1995) that, in e xpectation of future compensation because of information monopolies, banks 
with a close relationship are ready to provide more credit to their customers given borrower 
quality. 
Table 10.  Differences between the housebank and non-housebank subgroup coefficients for borrower groups 
with different numbers of bank relationships. Results gained by three variations with changing 
referential variables of the regression of the collateralized percentage of the borrower total credit line 
COLLAT (coefficients of the housebank subgroup variables, standard errors in parentheses) 
variable  non-housebank 
(NB) 
housebank 
(HB) 
 
NUMB1_3  reference  14.768***  (4.128) 
NUMB4_7  reference  3.199  (3.535) 
NUMB8_  reference  10.951**  (5.474) 
 
In regressions (1) and (2) dummy variables controlling for the belonging to bank B1 to B6 
are included. However, the coefficients do not indicate any systematic differences with 
respect to bank size. 
6.  Conclusion 
This paper provides evidence that the number of bank relationships is predominantly 
influenced by firm size. Firm quality does not have any effect. A housebank relationship goes 
in line with a small number of bank relationships. 
The number of bank relationships itself indicates bank competition for customers. While 
interest rate spreads are not influenced by the number of bank relationships collateral 
requirements are stricter for b orrower groups with only a few bank relationships compared to 
borrowers with many relationships. The division of borrowers into subgroups with and 
without a special housebank relationship underlines the findings concerning the relation 
between the number o f bank relationships and collateralization. In the group of borrowers 
with a few bank relationships, borrowers with a housebank relationship provide more 
collateral than borrowers with no housebank relationship. 
As it should be expected, loan interest rates and collateralization are influenced by 
borrower quality represented by bank internal credit ratings. Loan rates are high when  
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borrower quality is low. Borrowers of the worst qualities provide more collateral than the 
better ones. Thus, banks try to reduce their exposure to borrower risk by collateral 
requirement and borrowers of bad quality do not have the negotiation power to deny it. 
The findings on credit availability suggest that firms with a close relationship to a 
housebank receive a higher proportion of financing from this bank compared to banks without 
such a close relationship. This result provides support for Petersen and Rajan (1995) who 
conclude that close bank relationships are suitable to attenuate credit rationing problems. 
Thus, sometimes less competition is useful. 
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